Key themes
Historical foundations of active measures — Rid examines declassified documents from the Bulgarian secret police archives containing KGB active measures proposals, revealing Soviet methodology: identifying "unresolved contradictions" (existing social cleavages), amplifying existing conspiracy theories, and maintaining cultural expertise on target societies. Contrasts this with a "bumper sticker" characterization: disinformation is a weapon of weak authoritarian regimes who lack conventional military or economic power.
U.S.-Soviet asymmetry — The U.S. conducted comparable active measures in the 1950s (e.g., Operation Elsie Cassock in Berlin), but de-escalated circa 1960s as domestic oversight mechanisms improved. The Soviet Union escalated during the same period. Rid notes this asymmetry persists: the West abandoned systematic disinformation campaigns while authoritarian regimes doubled down, partly because authoritarian regimes have fewer constraints on covert action and benefit more from narrative control.
How the internet complicates active measures — Counterintuitively, the internet makes certain active measures harder, not easier. During the Cold War, an operation succeeded if it tricked a few journalists into major coverage; today, even amplified fake content on obscure websites struggles to "move the needle" in an oversaturated information landscape. Rid challenges conventional wisdom that modern operations are more powerful: they're actually harder to execute with measurable impact. However, the internet enables new vectors: hacking, dumping, leaked information, and WikiLeaks-style activism (originally a form of Western activism, now weaponized by state actors).
Leak culture and dual-use activism — Wikileaks emerged not as a completely new phenomenon but as the maturation of leak activism that began in the Vietnam era. State actors (particularly Russia) learned to harness and exploit this Western activist tradition, enabling massive information exfiltration without human risk to intelligence assets.
Notes
Rid's historical perspective is essential context for modern disinformation research. His claim that contemporary operations are paradoxically harder to execute with measurable impact due to information saturation is an important corrective to oversimplified narratives about AI-enabled or bot-driven propaganda. The notion that authoritarian regimes rely on disinformation because it's their only tool (lacking conventional military advantage) frames the problem in terms of structural incentives rather than just capability.
The U.S.-Soviet asymmetry he documents also explains why modern Russian information operations appear more aggressive and systematic: they were never abandoned, whereas the U.S. formally constrained itself through oversight. This institutional history shapes the present landscape.