Key themes
Russian disinformation has three strategic goals. First, undermine Western democracy itself by polarizing societies and pitting citizens against each other. Second, distract Western attention from Russian military and political adventurism abroad (Ukraine, Syria, Central African Republic, Venezuela). Third, fuel domestic Russian propaganda ("what-aboutism") by pointing to Western failures as justification for authoritarianism at home. Disinformation serves all three simultaneously.
Disinformation works by information laundering, not fake accounts. Russian operatives move beyond simply creating fake accounts; they identify authentic activist groups, contact them with seemingly American personas and funding, and embed themselves in real grassroots movements. Example: In 2017, the Internet Research Agency spent $80 on Facebook ads supporting a genuine anti-Trump protest organized by progressive activists (Americans Take Action); the activists had no idea they were interfacing with Russian operatives. Once laundered into authentic discourse, disinformation becomes far harder for platforms to detect or remove because it appears to be organic citizen speech.
Disinformation weaponizes real grievances and polarization; it does not create them. The most resonant disinformation narratives exploit existing fissures: Estonia (ethnic and linguistic resentment of Russian minorities), Georgia (national pride and sovereignty), Czech Republic (anti-migrant sentiment), Poland (anti-LGBT and anti-Ukrainian sentiment), Ukraine (distrust of government and anti-NATO sentiment), United States (polarization on race, guns, governance). Russia identifies these vulnerabilities through segmented targeting and tests narratives to see which "stick," then amplifies what works.
Segmented messaging allows disinformation to target diverse populations simultaneously. Social media platforms provide ready-made segmentation (Facebook groups, interest-based targeting) that malign actors exploit. Rather than a one-size-fits-all propaganda line, Russia micro-segments messaging by region, demographic, and vulnerability. In diverse societies like the United States, this enables simultaneous amplification of contradictory narratives (supporting both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump) to maximize polarization and chaos.
Counter-disinformation efforts can backfire if poorly framed. The Czech Republic established a Center Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats to counter disinformation but failed to build public trust. President Miloš Zeman attacked it in his Christmas address, mischaracterizing it as "idea police." Once critics reframed the initiative, the government failed to defend it, and the center's effectiveness collapsed. Naming, transparency, and political defense matter enormously.
The solution is resilience-building, not censorship. Countries with the longest experience countering disinformation (Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine) have concluded that removing speech does not work; instead, they invest in building citizen resilience. Estonia's response to the 2007 Bronze Soldier crisis focused on integrating the ethnic Russian population through education, media access, and civic participation. The result: integration metrics improved markedly, and the country became less vulnerable to polarization narratives. Censorship-based approaches fail in democracies because they delegitimize the institutions deploying them.
Multi-stakeholder coordination is essential. Solutions require government investment in education and institutional trust; political leaders calling out disinformation regardless of party affiliation; tech platforms accepting responsibility for their infrastructure; civil society organizing; and individual citizens fact-checking before sharing. No single actor can address disinformation alone.
Case studies detailed
Estonia (Bronze Soldier Crisis, 2007). After Estonia joined NATO and the EU, Russia exploited grievances among the country's ethnic Russian minority (~25% of population). Ethnic Russians faced citizenship barriers, language requirements for education, and second-class economic status. When Estonia moved a WWII memorial statue, Russia fomented protests through Russian-language media and covert operations, leading to riots, one death, and infrastructure damage. Estonia's response focused on the human and informational element: Russian-language higher education, media investment, and outreach from government to Russian enclaves. Result: integration statistics show rising citizenship adoption and European identity among ethnic Russians over subsequent years.
Czech Republic. Anti-migrant sentiment following the 2015–2016 migrant crisis provided a wedge for Russian narratives. A center was established to counter disinformation, but political opposition successfully reframed it as "idea police." Without institutional defense, the effort collapsed.
United States (2017 flashmob operation). The Internet Research Agency contacted the genuine activist group Americans Take Action and sponsored a progressive protest in Washington DC on July 4, 2017 (musical theater-themed anti-Trump demonstration). Activists had no idea of the Russian connection. The protest was highly successful, and the Russian connection was only discovered later through court documents unsealed in the Mueller investigation. This exemplifies how foreign disinformation infiltrates authentic activism.
Mechanisms of influence
How infiltration works: Foreign actors create fake personas (e.g., "Helen Christopherson," a purported American donor), contact authentic activist groups over social media, offer small amounts of money or advertising support, and gain access to real American grassroots networks. Activists are often unaware of the foreign source.
How polarization spreads: Russia identifies existing tensions, amplifies narratives that exacerbate those tensions, and often pushes contradictory messages simultaneously (supporting both left and right to maximize societal chaos). The goal is not to convince people of a specific outcome but to increase confusion, distrust, and discord.
Why government counter-efforts fail: Poor naming and framing, lack of transparency and public engagement, allowing critics to redefine initiatives unchallenged, and insufficient investment in public trust-building.
Why censorship fails: Democracies that attempt to fight disinformation through speech removal delegate authority to government in ways that invite political exploitation and undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions themselves.
Notes
This talk represents mature practitioner synthesis. Jankowicz moves beyond technical discussions of botnets and algorithms to emphasize the human, institutional, and social dimensions of information warfare. The core insight—that disinformation works by exploiting real grievances rather than creating false ones—reframes defensive strategy from fighting fake information to building resilience against polarization and institutional erosion.
The case studies demonstrate that disinformation is not foreign-only but operates at the intersection of foreign actors and domestic vulnerabilities. Countries with the longest experience (Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine) converged on resilience-building through education and integration rather than censorship, suggesting that defensive strategies must address underlying social cleavages, not just the narratives amplifying them.
A critical contribution is Jankowicz's analysis of information laundering: how foreign actors embed themselves in authentic activism to gain credibility and access. This challenges the simplistic narrative that disinformation "is all bots and trolls" and demands more sophisticated detection and platform accountability.
The emphasis on multi-stakeholder coordination and the need for non-partisan political leadership suggests that disinformation is fundamentally a problem of institutional and civic health, not a purely technological or media literacy problem.