Key claims
Russian disinformation has evolved from fake accounts to infiltrating authentic activism. In 2017, the IRA contacted genuine progressive activist groups and funded their anti-Trump protests via Facebook ads ($80 to reach 58,000 people). The activists had no idea they were communicating with Russian operatives posing as American donors. This represents a shift from creating fake accounts to embedding in real American discourse, making detection and response far more difficult than previous "whack-a-troll" approaches.
Disinformation weaponizes existing polarization and real grievances. Russian tactics do not create polarization from scratch but exploit cracks already present in democracies. In the Czech Republic, Islamophobic sentiments over the 2015–2016 migrant crisis provided a wedge. In the U.S., disinformation amplifies authentic political divisions, pitting Americans against each other. The goal is not to convince but to confuse and exacerbate conflict.
Government counter-disinformation efforts can backfire if poorly communicated. The Czech Republic established a anti-disinformation center but failed to build public legitimacy. President Miloš Zeman attacked it in his Christmas address, falsely characterizing it as "idea police" despite its actual mandate being immigration-related fact-checking. This politicization undermined the center's effectiveness; the government allowed critics to redefine its mission.
Partisan actors and foreign adversaries now deploy identical tactics. American political parties and candidates use the same disinformation methods that Russia uses: targeting emotional vulnerabilities, amplifying divisive narratives, and dismantling trust in institutions. The U.S. is "doing our adversaries' work for them" by weaponizing disinformation domestically.
Gender-based online harassment is a weapon against women speaking on misinformation. Jankowicz received sustained, coordinated abuse including violent threats, sexualized attacks, and harassment targeting her pregnancy after leading the Disinformation Governance Board. This abuse was tolerated and even amplified by political actors; the government failed to defend her. The pattern silences women and marginalized communities from contributing to solutions.
Censorship and speech removal are ineffective against disinformation. Countries that have fought disinformation longest (Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine) have learned that removing speech does not work. Instead, they invest in building citizen resilience: media literacy, civic engagement, local-language media, and bridging initiatives that reduce the polarization disinformation exploits.
Democratic responses require multi-stakeholder action, not just government or tech platforms. Solutions require government investment in education, political leaders calling out disinformation regardless of party, tech platforms accepting responsibility, civil society organizing, and individual users fact-checking before sharing.
Mechanisms discussed
How infiltration works:
- Foreign actors create fake personas (e.g., "Helen Christopherson," a fake American donor persona)
- They contact authentic activist groups over social media
- They offer small amounts of money ($80) or advertising support
- Activists often accept, unaware of the source
- The foreign actor now has a channel to authentic American grassroots discourse
How disinformation spreads through polarization:
- Russia identifies existing tensions (Islamophobia, partisan divisions, government distrust)
- They amplify narratives that exacerbate these tensions
- Multiple narratives are simultaneously pushed (left-wing and right-wing content, contradictory theories)
- The cumulative effect is to increase societal confusion and distrust, not to convince people of a specific narrative
Why government counter-efforts fail:
- Poor naming and framing (e.g., "Center Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats" is vague and politically vulnerable)
- Lack of transparency and public engagement
- Allowing critics to redefine the initiative
- Insufficient investment in public trust-building
Why individual actions matter:
- Individuals are on the "front lines" of information warfare
- Every social media post, retweet, and share either amplifies or restricts disinformation
- Fact-checking before sharing, questioning emotional reactions, and remembering the human on the other side of the screen are critical practices
Notes
This lecture is a practitioner's synthesis of disinformation research and policy experience. Jankowicz moves beyond technical discussions of botnets and algorithms to focus on the human and institutional dimensions of information warfare: how real activists become unwitting vectors for foreign influence, how government responses can be weaponized through political opposition, and how individual citizens hold power to resist disinformation through literacy and critical engagement.
A critical contribution is the observation that disinformation in mature democracies increasingly comes from inside the house—from domestic political actors who adopt foreign tactics. This reframes the problem from "defense against foreign interference" to "addressing domestic political conduct and polarization." By the time foreign adversaries infiltrate domestic discourse, the polarization they exploit is already present and weaponizable.
The case of Nina Jankowicz's own experience leading the Disinformation Governance Board illustrates a paradox: an expert appointed to defend against misinformation was herself subject to an industrial-scale misinformation campaign, and the government failed to respond effectively. This demonstrates that technical and policy solutions are insufficient without institutional commitment to truth and defense of those working on these issues.
The emphasis on individual action ("you are on the front lines") is a call for distributed resilience rather than top-down control. This aligns with research from Estonia, Georgia, Poland, and Ukraine showing that the most effective counter-disinformation strategies empower citizens through literacy, local media investment, and civic participation rather than through censorship or speech removal.
Notably absent from this talk is discussion of technological detection or automated fact-checking, which Jankowicz correctly identifies as necessary but insufficient. Instead, she focuses on the structural conditions (polarization, institutional failure, political incentives) that enable disinformation to thrive—a social science framing that complements computer science approaches.