Contributions
- Defines "disinformation" as intentional, inaccurate information spread strategically to advance political goals, distinguishing it from misinformation and isolated false reports.
- Identifies three dimensions of an emerging "disinformation order": (1) alt-right and radical-right networks producing and amplifying disruptive narratives; (2) foreign state actors (Russia) conducting strategic information warfare; (3) political entrepreneurs capitalizing on the "attention economy" to generate engagement and profit.
- Demonstrates how the shift from concentrated, trusted media to fragmented social media platforms has enabled both domestic and foreign actors to bypass mainstream fact-checking and institutional gatekeeping.
- Traces the ecosystem of alt-right media (Breitbart, Infowars, etc.) and its symbiotic relationship with conservative mainstream media and Trump's political messaging.
- Documents Russian hybrid-warfare tactics, including troll factories, bot networks, and coordinated disinformation campaigns, embedded in broader NATO-related tensions.
- Argues that declining institutional authority (in press, government, civil institutions) is both a cause and consequence of disinformation's effectiveness: fragmented public spheres enable malicious actors to reach vast audiences, while disinformation erodes trust that would otherwise limit its spread.
Method
The paper combines historical case analysis, media ecology analysis, and institutional theory. The authors examine specific disinformation campaigns (Sweden fake crime wave, Trump's election-related false claims, Russia's interference operations) to illustrate how disruptive communication flows work in practice. They map the ecosystem of actors involved—from alt-right media networks to foreign intelligence services—and connect these to broader shifts in media systems and political communication. The analysis is grounded in communication and political theory, examining institutional vulnerability, trust decline, and the role of media fragmentation.
Results
- Documents the rise of strategic disinformation tied to political polarization and institutional erosion in democracies including the US, UK, Germany, Italy, and Sweden.
- Shows that mainstream press coverage often amplifies disinformation (the "amplifier effect"), inadvertently spreading false narratives while attempting fact-checking.
- Demonstrates that disinformation campaigns successfully exploit public sphere disruptions to reach wide audiences; fake stories sometimes outperformed real news on Facebook during the 2016 US election.
- Illustrates how foreign and domestic disinformation operations, though distinct in origin, converge in targeting the same institutional vulnerabilities and leverage the same social media infrastructure.
- Identifies that trust decline in institutions is unevenly distributed but pronounced across democracies, particularly in nations with strong radical-right movements.
Notes
Strengths:
- Broad, systemic framing that connects domestic (alt-right) and foreign (Russian) disinformation operations without conflating them, showing how both exploit the same institutional vulnerabilities.
- Historically grounded with specific, documented cases (Sweden, Brexit, Trump, Russian interference).
- Challenges the narrow "fake news" framing, arguing for understanding disinformation as a systemic problem rooted in institutional decline and media fragmentation.
- Emphasizes the role of trust and institutional authority in determining disinformation's effectiveness—a macro-level insight often missing from technical detection work.
Limitations:
- Published in 2018; does not address post-2018 developments (TikTok, ChatGPT, advanced deepfakes, etc.).
- Primarily European and US-focused; generalizations to other regions require caution.
- More diagnostic than prescriptive; the paper identifies the problem but offers limited concrete policy or technical solutions.
- The "disruptive communication order" concept is somewhat loose and could benefit from more formal theorization.
Future directions:
- How have tech platforms' content moderation policies since 2018 affected these dynamics?
- Do institutional trust interventions (media literacy, transparency, representation) effectively counter the mechanisms the paper identifies?
- How do the paper's frameworks apply to disinformation about non-political topics (health, climate, science)?