Does Analytic Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence from Ukraine

Aaron Erlich; Calvin Garner; Gordon Pennycook; David Rand

In brief

In two large Ukrainian samples (N=1,974 online, N=9,474 face-to-face), analytic thinking—measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test—was associated with greater ability to discern truth from pro-Kremlin disinformation, even among respondents strongly oriented toward Russia. This contradicts motivated system 2 reasoning theory (which predicts more thinking → more polarization) and instead supports a classical reasoning account: analytic thinking improves accuracy judgments across the political spectrum in Ukraine's uniquely challenged information environment.

Contributions

Tests whether analytic thinking helps Ukrainians resist pro-Kremlin disinformation in a non-U.S. context with legacy media distrust and sustained information warfare.
Challenges the motivated system 2 reasoning theory by showing that higher analytic ability does not predict greater susceptibility to ideologically congenial misinformation.
Demonstrates that cognitive reflection (CRT and AOT measures) predicts lower belief in false pro-Kremlin narratives and higher belief in true stories, regardless of respondents' political orientation toward Russia.
Extends prior U.S.-based findings on analytic thinking and fake news to a qualitatively different information environment with organized, sustained disinformation campaigns.

Method

Two studies commissioned by the National Democratic Institute examined Ukrainian citizens' susceptibility to pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives.

Study 1: Online survey via Infosapiens panel (N=1,974, March 2019). Respondents evaluated 16 headlines (4 subjects × 3 disinformation strategies + 1 true headline per subject) on perceived accuracy using a 6-point scale. Measured analytic thinking via 7-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and 24-item Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale. Captured Russian ethnolinguistic identity and political orientation toward Russia/Europe.

Study 2: Face-to-face, nationally representative survey via Kyiv Institute of International Sociology (N=9,474, September–October 2019). Similar design with 18 headlines evaluated on 7-point scale. Used 4-item CRT and 6-item AOT battery. Measured political orientation via question on whether Russia is a threat.

Headlines: Selected from EU vs. Disinfo database covering three pro-Kremlin disinformation strategies: undermining Ukrainian state/government, driving wedges between Ukraine and allies, and promoting a positive view of Russia. Covered four broad subjects: politics/government, economy, military, and culture/identity.

Results

Primary finding: Across both studies, higher cognitive reflection (CRT) was associated with increased ability to distinguish true from false stories. In Study 1, CRT predicted 0.306 points lower belief in false stories (p < 0.001); in Study 2, CRT predicted 0.294 points lower belief (p < 0.001). CRT also consistently predicted higher belief in true stories (Study 1: 0.698, Study 2: 0.599, both p < 0.001).

Ideology independence: Cognitive reflection predicted better truth discernment even among respondents strongly oriented toward Russia. For example, in Study 1, a highly Russia-oriented respondent with high CRT rated disinformation stories 0.33 points lower (on the belief scale) than a similarly Russia-oriented respondent with low CRT.

AOT effects: The Actively Open-minded Thinking scale showed similar patterns in Study 1 but weaker effects in Study 2 (likely due to the abbreviated 6-item measure).

Key numerical comparison: Respondents in the third quartile of Russian ethnolinguistic identity with the highest CRT scores rated disinformation as 2.9–3.8 on the false scale (Studies 1–2), compared to 2.2–2.25 for those in the first quartile with lowest CRT—demonstrating substantial cognitive reflection effects across the spectrum.

Ideology effects: While respondents with stronger pro-Russia political orientation did show higher overall belief in pro-Kremlin narratives and lower belief in true stories, this pattern was not driven by analytical thinking amplifying political bias. Instead, the relationship between analytic thinking and accuracy held across all orientations.

Notes

This paper is important because it extends analytic-thinking–and-fake-news research beyond Western democracies to a context (Ukraine) with a fundamentally different media environment: legacy distrust due to post-Soviet history, weak journalistic standards, concentrated media ownership, and sustained organized disinformation campaigns. The finding that cognitive reflection still predicts truth discernment in this harsh environment strengthens the claim that analytical thinking genuinely improves information processing rather than merely amplifying ideology through motivated reasoning. The pre-registration, large nationally representative sample (Study 2), and consistency across two independent measures (CRT and AOT) provide robust evidence. However, the research does not test political knowledge or general intelligence separately, leaving open whether effects are specific to reflection or reflect broader cognitive ability. Future work could disentangle these factors and examine why AOT effects weakened in Study 2.