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The platform governance triangle: conceptualising the informal regulation of online content

Author: Robert Gorwa
Publication: Internet Policy Review, Volume 8, Issue 2
Date: June 30, 2019 — DOI

TL;DR

This article applies the "governance triangle" model (Abbott & Sindal, 2009) to understand informal regulatory arrangements governing platform content. Gorwa examines initiatives like Facebook's Oversight Body and the Christchurch Call, showing how states, platforms, and civil society actors interact in multi-stakeholder governance arrangements. Three key dynamics shape these informal regulations: varying actor competencies, contested legitimation politics, and power asymmetries between participants.

Key arguments

  • Platform governance is increasingly organized through multi-stakeholder arrangements involving private firms, states, and NGOs rather than traditional top-down regulation alone.
  • The governance triangle model (positioning states at apex, NGOs at left, firms at right) provides a useful framework for visualizing and analyzing these informal regulatory initiatives.
  • Three dynamics determine the effectiveness and character of informal platform regulation:
  • Actor competencies: different participants bring different expertise; platforms have algorithmic/operational knowledge, governments have regulatory authority, civil society has legitimacy and normative framing.
  • Legitimation politics: initiatives compete for legitimacy; voluntary arrangements must appear credible and multi-stakeholder to gain acceptance.
  • Power relations: asymmetries persist despite formal multi-stakeholder framing; platforms retain significant control over implementation and decision-making.
  • Informal governance arrangements are becoming the primary mode of platform content regulation in Europe and globally, reflecting both industry resistance to traditional regulation and government preference for flexible, negotiated approaches.

Context

The article emerged amid a wave of policy initiatives responding to content concerns: Facebook's announcement of an Oversight Body (November 2018), the Christchurch Call (May 2019), and the EU's Code of Practice on Disinformation. Gorwa positions these as examples of "transnational new governance" — regulatory innovation beyond classical state-based or market-based models.

Connections

Notes

Strengths: provides a valuable conceptual framework for understanding the proliferation of informal platform governance initiatives; grounded in established political science literature on transnational governance; timely given the rapid emergence of oversight bodies and multi-stakeholder processes.

Limitations: focuses primarily on European examples; published early (2019), before many of the most consequential governance arrangements (transparency reports, algorithmic impact assessments) matured; limited empirical assessment of whether these informal arrangements actually reduce harmful content or improve outcomes.