Partisan differences refer to the variation in how people across the political spectrum engage with misinformation—from initial belief formation to deliberate or inadvertent sharing. Research examines whether psychological mechanisms underlying misinformation belief differ by political affiliation and whether interventions have asymmetric effectiveness.
Key empirical patterns
- Asymmetric sharing: Conservatives/Republicans in the U.S. share more misinformation than liberals/Democrats on social media in observational data, though the size of this asymmetry varies by content type
- Accuracy discernment: Mixed evidence on whether political affiliation predicts the ability to distinguish true from false headlines; some studies find Republicans worse at discernment, others find no significant difference
- Belief/sharing disconnect: Even groups with similar accuracy discernment may share different amounts of false news due to differences in sharing norms or identity-congruent content motivation
- Intervention effects moderation: Some accuracy-prompt studies find effects stronger for Democrats/liberals, though not consistently across all operationalizations
- Perceived accuracy: Conservatives may rate ideologically-congruent misinformation as more accurate than liberals, reducing the efficacy of accuracy-focused interventions for those content
Key papers
- Martel et al. (2024) — On the Efficacy of Accuracy Prompts Across Partisan Lines: An Adversarial Collaboration — Examines whether partisan affiliation moderates the effectiveness of accuracy prompts; finds effects present for both parties but moderation in 50% of specifications, driven by partisan identity rather than ideology
- Rathje, Van Bavel & van der Linden (2021) — Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media — Analyzes 2.7M Facebook and Twitter posts showing out-group language is the strongest predictor of engagement, suggesting social media may inadvertently reward polarizing content
- Pennycook & Rand (2022) — Accuracy prompts are a replicable and generalizable approach for reducing the spread of misinformation — Tests whether conservatism moderates accuracy-prompt effects; finds effects generalize across ideological spectrum
- Guess et al. (2019) — Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 U.S. election — Estimates that 4% of Americans and 11% of those active on social media visited a fake news domain; right-leaning voters visited fake news domains much more frequently
- Vosoughi, Roy & Aral (2017) — The spread of true and false news online — Shows false news spreads faster and wider than true news on Twitter; patterns differ by political topic